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Abstract
This article draws on the argument that users on corporate social media conduct labour through the sharing of user-
generated content. Critical political economists argue that such acts contribute to value creation on social media and
are therefore to be seen as labour. Following a brief introduction of this paradigm, I relate it to the notion of affective
labour which has been popularised by the Marxist thinkers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. To them, affective labour
(as a sub-category of immaterial labour) denotes embodied forms of labour that are about passion, well-being, feelings of
ease, immaterial products and generally a kind of communicative relationality between individuals. I point to some prob-
lems with a lack of clarity in their conceptualisation of affective labour and argue that the Freudian model of affect can
help in theorising affective labour further through a focus on social media. According to Freud, affect can be understood
as a subjective, bodily experience which is in tension with the discursive and denotes a momentary feeling of bodily dis-
possession. In order to illustrate those points, I draw on some data from a research project which featured interviews with
social media users who have facial disfigurements about their affective experiences online. The narratives attempt to turn
embodied experiences into discourse.
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1. Introduction
The field of digital labour studies has seen increasing
publications in recent years that focus on framing user
activity on social media as labour. Drawing on Marx’s
labour theory of value, scholars have argued that user-
generated content on commercial social media plat-
forms, such as Facebook, Twitter, WeChat, or Weibo, is
commodified and sold to advertisers. Users thus con-
tribute to value being generated without receiving any
monetary returns (e.g., Andrejevic, 2011, 2014; Comor,
2010; Dean, 2014; Fisher, 2012; Fuchs, 2012, 2014; Fuchs
& Sevignani, 2013; Terranova, 2000). Many have argued
that such user labour is also affective labour because it
is about communication, relationships, desires, embodi-
ment, or in short about the circulation of affects online
(Dean, 2014; Jarrett, 2015; Pybus, 2015). The works of
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004) on imma-
terial and affective labour have been of particular influ-
ence in this regard. This article engages with the above
literature and critically discusses the lack of definitions of
affective labour. The term affective labour is frequently
evoked in the literature without clearly defining what is
specifically affective about it. What is the nature of affec-
tive labour on social media?
In attempting to answer that question, I offer a
psychoanalytic conceptualisation of affective labour by
drawing on Freud’s works on affect. Freud allows us to
regard affective labour as a subjective process that is in-
fluenced by unconscious and relational dimensions as
well as social forces. On social media, this means that
affective labour occurs in relation to individuals’ bodies
and embodied stateswhich are transformed into content.
A psychoanalytic model of affective labour refers to al-
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ready embodied, affective bodily states that influence af-
fective labour online. Such states can never be fully trans-
lated into user-generated content, because they consist
of elements which are beyond the representational and
discursive realm (such as bodily experiences). I illustrate
this model with some examples from a recent research
project on individuals with visible facial differences and
their use of social media for raising awareness of their
conditions. I discuss selected interview narratives which
show attempts at talking about affective-digital labour
on social media that are in relation to the individuals’
bodies, and the difficulty of representing themselves
and engaging with others online. Affect, then, may be
seen as an attempt to articulate bodily experiences in
user-generated content, but this attempt always remains
somewhat incomplete.
2. The Digital and Affective Labour Paradigms
Critical political economy scholars have argued that the
user activity on commercial social media platforms con-
stitutes unpaid labour. This argument has been most no-
tably advanced by Christian Fuchs (2010, 2012, 2014)
who draws on Karl Marx’s labour theory of value and Dal-
las Smythe’s (1981) notion of the audience commodity.
For Marx, any activity that generates exchange value is
considered labour (1976). Corporate socialmedia compa-
nies such as YouTube, Facebook or Twitter (Ekman, 2012;
Fisher, 2012) rely on users actively producing content
which is then sold to advertisers to enable targeted ad-
vertising in return. Users do not receive a remuneration
for this labour, but a free platform. As Fuchs elaborates:
Users spend time on corporate Internet platforms
that are funded by targeted advertising capital accu-
mulation models. The time spent on corporate plat-
forms is the value created by their unpaid digital
labour. Their digital labour creates social relations,
profile data, user-generated content and transaction
data (browsing behaviour)—a data commodity that
is offered for sale by Internet corporations to adver-
tising clients that can select certain user groups they
want to target. The act of exploitation is already cre-
ated by the circumstance that users create a data com-
modity, in which their online work time is objectified,
and that they do not own this data themselves, but
rather corporate Internet platforms with the help of
terms of use and privacy policies acquire ownership of
this data. Corporate Internet platforms offer the data
commodity that is the result of Internet presumption
activity for sale to advertisers. The value realization
process, the transformation of value into profit, takes
place when targeted users view the advertisement
(pay per view) or click on it (pay per click). (Fuchs,
2014, pp. 95–96)
In that sense, the time spent producing user-generated
content on social media platforms amounts to unpaid
labour which contributes towards profit for the social
media companies. There has been some critique of this
argument and the digital labour debate is still ongo-
ing (see, e.g., Jarrett, 2015, for an overview) but can-
not be covered here in greater detail. Related to this
notion of digital labour, is the concept of immaterial
labour, of which affective labour is a subset, developed
by the Marxist philosophers Maurizio Lazzarato (1996)
andMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004). They
argue that within informational capitalism (Dean, 2014;
Fuchs, 2008) there is a transformation in the workplace
towards work which does not produce a material, tan-
gible product but immaterial products. For example,
call centre work, advertising creation, prostitution, act-
ing, software design. Hardt and Negri define immaterial
labour as labour “that creates immaterial products, such
as knowledge, information, communication, a relation-
ship, or an emotional response” (2004 p. 108). They note
that there is an increasing drive for the labour process
to become immaterial: “today labour and society have
to informationalize, become intelligent, become commu-
nicative, become affective” (2004 p. 109). For Hardt and
Negri, affective labour is a component, or sub-aspect, of
immaterial labour. I follow and develop their definition
in this article. It involves “the production and manipula-
tion of affect and requires (virtual or actual) human con-
tact, labour in the bodily mode…the labour is immaterial,
even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its
products are intangible, a feeling of ease, well-being, sat-
isfaction, excitement or passion” (2000, p. 292).
Examples of affective labour include software design-
ers, web developers, waiters and waitresses, sex work-
ers, academics, and service workers (Hearn, 2010, p. 63).
However, Hardt and Negri never clearly define what they
mean by affect (Lanoix, 2013) and their use of the term
seems to be implicitly more about intellectual-based
work rather than fully embodied work. There is a privi-
lege of reason and rationality over the messiness of em-
bodied labour (Ahmed, 2014, p. 206). It is not clear how
the term affective labour considerably advances discus-
sions or develops arguments that much earlier concepts,
such as Hochschild’s emotional labour (1983), could not
have articulated already. While certain types of indus-
tries have increased significantly over the past decades
(information service work, care work, creative industries
jobs), the question poses itself: what is distinctly “affec-
tive” about such work?
Kylie Jarrett (2015) and others (e.g., Coté & Pybus,
2011) have argued that social media use which is ex-
ploited is particularly affective. This affectivity is estab-
lished through exchanges between a user, the platform
interfaces and other users (e.g., in commenting on posts
on Facebook, in re-tweeting on Twitter, in engaging in a
discussion on Instagram). All of those examples are rela-
tional instances of the circulation of content. The more
content circulates, the better for socialmedia companies.
Jodi Dean’s work on communicative capitalism (2014)
makes a similar argument. While Dean, who draws on
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Lacanian ideas, has made important points about the
role of affect in communicative capitalism, she has not
explored how it can be studied empirically through a
focus on lived experiences of individuals. There is thus
scope to develop this critical tradition further. Recently,
a number of scholars have specifically connected the no-
tion of affect with social media (Clough, 2013; Garde-
Hansen & Gorton, 2013; Johanssen, 2016; Karatzogianni
& Kuntsman, 2012; Paasonen, Hillis, & Petit, 2015; Samp-
son, 2012). Paasonen et al. write that many forms of
online user activity are about affect in a broader sense
(e.g. reading news online, using Google, posting an up-
date on social media). Such intense “affective invest-
ments” (2015, p. 7) show “articulations of desire, se-
duction, trust, and memory; sharp jolts of anger and
interest; political passions; investments of time, labor,
and financial capital; and the frictions and pleasures of
archival practices” (2015, p. 1). Often, communication
on social media is not “merely instrumental” (Paasonen
et al., 2015, p. 10) and about goal-directed actions but
also beyond rationality and conscious control. It is this
idea of an intense form of embodied engagement with
the Internet that makes affect a useful concept to work
with when it comes to critically analysing social media
use. Kylie Jarrett (2015) has similarly described social me-
dia use: “Rather than merely a site of disembodied ratio-
nality, the Internet is a site for physical arousal, height-
ened emotion and the cultivation and maintenance of
rich social relationships” (p. 121).
However, perhaps due to affect’s notorious slipperi-
ness and messiness as a concept, the term is often used
vaguely or contradictorily by different scholars. As noted,
Paasonen et al. write of “affective attachments” on the
Internet (2015, p. 1). Using social media may denote par-
ticular affective attachments or experiences, but what
is specifically affective about them? In his work on Tum-
blr and its queer community, Alexander Cho (2015) has
called affect “a moment of suspense, a shift, an attune-
ment between entities” (p. 44). Veronika Tzankova (2015)
has referred to networked affect, that is affective rela-
tionalities and communication online, as “a complex set
of intensities associated with rational and nonrational
modalities” (p. 62). Affect may “produce meanings that
are only implicitly articulated in online discourse and rep-
resentations” (Tzankova, 2015). The affect theorists Pa-
tricia Clough, Greg Goldberg, Rachel Schiff, AaronWeeks
and CraigWillse (2007) have defined affect as something
that “is meant to address the becoming abstract, and
therefore becoming subject to measure that which is
seemingly disparate” (Clough et al., 2007, p. 62). Admit-
tedly, I have taken such definitions out of context here,
but they demonstrate the complexity and diversity of af-
fect as a notion and its vagueness. I would like to offer
a psychoanalytic, Freudian model of affect that seeks to
clarify what affect means from a particular perspective.
I would like to take this aspect of social media use as
a form of unpaid, affective labour as a starting point in
order to theorise it by drawing on Freud. Focussing on
the inherent, rather than functional dimensions of affec-
tive labour on social media can add complexity to the
concepts of affective / digital labour. Feminist scholars
have made very important contributions to this debate
by inserting care labour, reproductive labour, or femi-
nised work back into the debate (Jarrett, 2015). There is
scope to continue this kind of work. There are inherent
problemswith howHardt and Negri (2000, 2004) use the
term affective labour, because they do not really specify
what is essentially affective about it or where the affec-
tivity lies (see Johanssen, in press, for an extended dis-
cussion of this point), but I would like to focus here on
the use of the term in relation to social media.
3. Affect and Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud (1981), in contrast to many affect theo-
ries which emphasise the transindividual, non-discursive
qualities and floating state of affect, developed a model
that regards affect as an embodied, subjective experi-
ence. For him, an affective experience is felt through the
body by being affected by someone or something. For ex-
ample, in response to something the subject may see on
social media. An affective experience is momentary and
transitory and constitutes amovement from the body to-
wards the social, from the internal towards the external.
In an affective experience, the affect moves and is, what
Freud called, “discharged” (1981a) by the subject. An af-
fective experience can either be pleasurable or unplea-
surable. It is not experienced or named as a specific emo-
tion. Instead, it is difficult for the individual to precisely
explain how they have felt during an affective experience.
Affect, for Freud, always designates a state ofmomentary
bodily dispossession. The psychoanalyst Ruth Stein has
offered a useful definition in this context:
“my body speaks itself to me”; when I am feeling,
I possess my body, but at that same moment, the
body is also its own speaker, and the three terms join
together and link my possession (“my”), the object of
this possession (“body”), and that which denies my
possession (“it speaks”―and in that it is its own mas-
ter, or speaker, thereby denying my possession of it-
self). (Stein, 1999, p. 127)
The body is experienced as “other” in such moments. Af-
fect marks almost a degree of separation between the
body and how the subject feels the body speaking it-
self. Such experiences can be reflected on afterwards.
The individual cannot clearly define the affective quali-
ties but tries to make sense of them through language
(Johanssen, 2016). There is a sense of tension in try-
ing to describe how an individual was affected by a par-
ticular bodily sensation. In that sense, affective experi-
ences are situated in-between the discursive and the
non-discursive (Green, 1999). The psychoanalytic con-
ceptualisation of affect is particularly useful because it,
in contrast to most affect theories in the humanities, ar-
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gues that “affect” designates a subjective, bodily experi-
ence that is felt rather than completely known by the in-
dividual. The Freudian affect model is beneficial for this
project because it places an emphasis on a tension be-
tween discursive and bodily aspects of experiences. It
therefore allowed to research affective experiences em-
pirically through qualitative interviews. In the next sec-
tion, I present some examples that assist in sketching out
amodel of affective labour on social media which is influ-
enced by psychoanalysis.
4. Affective Labour on Social Media: Raising
Awareness of Facial Disfigurements
The data presented in this section was gathered as
part of a research project on the use of social me-
dia by people with facial disfigurements in the UK
(https://sites.google.com/view/mediadisfigurement). In
the qualitative interviews, individuals were encouraged
to speak without too much intervention on the part
of the interviewer. While some affect theories tend to
move away from discourse-based methods and analy-
ses, this project was specifically interested in giving peo-
ple with facial disfigurements, who are often misrep-
resented in the media, a voice so that they could ac-
count for their own feelings and embodied experiences
of using social media. Participants were also encouraged
to talk about their life histories and general life experi-
ences of living with disfigurements. It was thus hoped
that through their narratives discursive attempts could
emerge that illustrate affective experiences. Seven in-
dividuals were interviewed and, coincidentally, all pre-
sented a very professional use of social media which was
aimed at raising awareness of facial disfigurements, at
disrupting stereotypes and engaging with the wider pub-
lic (Garrisi & Johanssen, 2018; Johanssen&Garrisi, 2017).
From the outset, one could describe such forms of social
media use as a kind of campaigning, or professionalised
labour with specific goals in mind.
4.1. Different Bodies on Social Media
One research participant had sustained burns as a young
infant. As she grew up, she was faced with a changing
body, like all of us, but her burns would change through-
out her life. She explained:
Like with burns where it doesn’t grow, it just pulls
and like normal skin grows and stretches, where burns
doesn’t, so and reconstructive surgery and it is alter-
ing an image that you already see in the mirror, so
you may get used to a scar, you may get used to a
burn but then you’re having surgery and it may get
altered and then you develop that kind of attachment
to your original burns which is weird, so kinda like it’s,
I don’t know how to explain it, it’s kinda like, it just
kinda knocks you for six, so it and it justmakes you feel
like a bit alien having this new burn, or this new scar,
or this new skin graft, you’re like “Oh what is this?”,
will that bother ya, that little skin graft, but not hav-
ing burns since you are eighteen months that is really
weird erm but like where it doesn’t grow or stretch it
may like leave, it might make, so for example, I can’t
explain it, can you see here? [Points to her arm]. (I3)
The quote suggests how her body was affected by a par-
ticular experience of living with burns. The narrative can
be seen as an attempt to render the affective experi-
ences associatedwith growing upwith a particular bodily
condition into language. The interviewee was not quite
able to fully describe her embodied state: “I can’t explain
it”, she said. Living with burns and a changing body was
described by her in affective terms which stressed bod-
ily functions and an embodied relatedness to being in
the world, but she seemed not fully able to turn affec-
tive experiences into language. Such states were often
described by the interviewees through bodily terms. An-
other interviewee specifically wondered about her usage
of the word “disfigurement” and if it was an appropriate
signifier for describing a bodily condition:
You know, I remember actually, you know, I didn’t
even really consider myself, or I had, the word disfig-
ured, I didn’t even attribute that word to myself un-
til, like, until, I think it was on my last operation, so
I would have been about 20-ish. I met my surgeon,
and he said, “Oh yes, this…” He said a comment like,
“Oh yes, this type of disfigurement blah, bah, blah.”
I was like, “Ah! I’m disfigured?” I was like, “Oh yes, of
course I am.” But I just always saw myself as wonky,
or you know, I don’t know, I just never. (I5)
The term “disfigured” possibly symbolised particular
states of being for the participant and she was affected
by a surgeon referring to her as having a “disfigurement”,
thereby attributing a particular discursive construction
to her. The woman may have felt labelled by someone
else, a doctor with considerable symbolic and actual
power, with a medical term. She had not really defined
herself and her own bodily experiences through the sin-
gle term “disfigurement” up until thatmoment. The term
“disfigurement” may have contributed to a feeling of dif-
ference from other bodies for the individual. Bodily dif-
ferences are often recognisable and enforced by others.
The surgeon probably needed to use the term to follow
medical protocol and appear professional. Being made
aware of being different from others was also discussed
bymany other interviewees in the project. It also showed
itself in how they spoke about their use of social media
for the purpose of raising awareness of facial disfigure-
ments. “On Instagram, I do more shots of, less shots of,
selfies, more shots of my full body” (I5). Another female
interviewee spoke about whom she followed on Twitter:
“I try and follow as many charities, as many charities, but
also ones that are appropriate to me erm to support”
(I3). Such narratives imply that the individuals’ use of so-
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cial media was clearly affected by their subjectivities. In-
terviewees emphasised a connection between how they
used social media, who they followed and their bodily
differences. Many also spoke of how they handled re-
sponses to their bodily differences online. For example,
one interviewee described the Facebook page she had
set up:
I made a mistake when I first erm started my page…,
I remember just taking a picture of my back and that
was it, so all you see was burns and it got quite a lot
of negative, yeah and a lot of negativity come from,
cos’ I think I had like an open page and I had loads
of followers and literally built three and a half thou-
sand friends and fifteen hundred followers but a lot
of the followers were literally like from India, from dif-
ferent parts of Asia and they were mainly the ones
that they would say, they’d say “pretty” and “slut” so
there was kind of, yeah they were putting me down
and saying “Eew that’s disgusting, that’s ugly, put it
away, cover up”, they were not happy with it, another
thing that I’ve learned is that when I’ve gone abroad
to other countries erm if I showoffmy scars, they tend
to laugh at me, almost like it’s a joke and I get that
quite a lot. (I2)
Another person, who had a cleft lip and palate, initially
said that they were not a big part of her identity: “the
cleft lip and palate is part of my identity, but it’s a small
part. It’s not the first, like, if you were to ask me to write
down ten things about myself, it might not even feature
on that list” (I5, lines 537–540). However, as the inter-
view went on, she described her use of Instagram:
I think the biggest thing, so on Instagram, like, occa-
sionally I will see a photo of myself, and I’m like, “Oh
that really highlights my cleft.” And I’ll be like, “Oh,
please use the one where it’s less visible.” Like, or less
apparent. So yes, so that’s something that Instagram
has, kind of, like, the way that I see, the way that I take
photos of myself, or that other people take of me, you
know, there are angles and there is, but then, again,
that’s kind of problem that everybody has, I think. Ev-
erybody has, like, unflattering photos and angles, and
more. So I, yes, like everybody else I’ll be, like, “Can
you use that one of me please because it looks a bit
better than this one?”…So if a photo is taken of me
from a, sort of, side angle on this side, my face looks
very dented. I’m like, “No!” So yes, so, photos, yes,
photo editing and things like that. But, yes, but there
are, I think it depends on how you use Instagram as
well. Mine is to, kind of, document my life. (I5)
The quotes suggest that affective-digital labour played
a key role in the participants’ social media use. It
showed how they brought particular embodied subjec-
tivities to their self-representation online and were then
affected by responses from others. Many participants
spoke about a pro-active and agentic approach to nego-
tiating their bodily differences on social media. Both of
the above quotes signify a heightened self-surveillance
as well. The two interviewees emphasised their own re-
sponsibilities of maintaining their social media profiles
and online images rather than the negative responses
from others. The interviewee spoke of the “mistake”
when uploading a particular photo that showed too
much of her burns. The other participant similarly spoke
about her desire to present herself online in a manner
that made her bodily difference less apparent. Going
back to Hardt and Negri’s (2000) definition of affective
labour, we can see how the two users spoke about their
affective-digital labour in a way that was about relation-
alities. It was aimed at other users and it seemed that in
order to be able to successfully raise awareness, forms
of self-representation needed to be conducted in a nu-
anced manner so that others were not offended. The
two quotes exemplify what it means to manage affect
online and attempts to create particular affective atmo-
spheres that were characterised by feelings of ease for
all involved. This can be further exemplified through an-
other narrative from a woman who spoke about her ef-
forts of raising awareness on social media:
I amdoing this all onmyown, Imean I had, I’ve got like
the little website which erm I had help with but I am
gonna start doing that myself and so a lot of it is done
on social media like Instagram, Twitter and Facebook,
I’ve got over 2000 people on my Facebook group and
that’s still building. I think if it did become a little bit
negative I’d definitely look at myself and think what is
it I am doing wrong? And I think what I tend to do is
just keep it erm not too “happy” happy cos’ otherwise
people go “Oh that’s crap, it can’t be like that all the
time” but I just always thank people, I always reply to
people as well which they seem to like and then they
come back with another reply saying “You’re great”
and yeah I don’t know what I am doing but it seems
to be working. (I2)
What is perhapsmost striking about those accounts of so-
cial media use is that they implicitly frame it as a form of
individualised, labour that comes close to the notion of
the entrepreneurial self. Rather than emphasising com-
munal and solidary forms of social media use, the people
interviewed all spoke of their solitary efforts. The narra-
tives further demonstrate the usefulness of the Freudian
model of affect as a subjective experience. The intervie-
wees spoke of their own bodies and how theywere being
affected and also affecting others through their embod-
ied subjectivities online. At the same time, their bodies
were already affected in the wider social world beyond
social media through being laughed at by others, stared
at, commented on or questioned. For Freud (1981a),
affect is situated at the intersection of the discursive
and non-discursive. The discursive narratives reproduced
here may be seen as attempts to speak about particular
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affective experiences andways of being in theworldwith
specific bodily differences. The specific strategies of us-
ing social media, which were akin to producing feelings
of ease and wellbeing that Hardt and Negri identify as
characteristics of affective labour, may thus be seen as
attempts to discharge or pre-empt unpleasurable affec-
tive experiences so that the affective labour online may
be experienced as pleasurable by the interviewees.
Related to this, one interviewee spoke of the positive
affectivity associated with the production of a YouTube
video which showed her bodily differences:
I released somuch and I didn’t realise that I would and
everything that I spoke about, it was just like erm I’ve
taken this coat off and I am now free like that’s exactly
how I felt and I went home and I realised that I was a
changed person, just from the video and what made
it even better was the fact that people started to see
it, they started to comment, put it on YouTube and
put it on my Facebook page so all my cousins, family,
friends they all see it and everybody was telling me
what an amazing woman I was and to hear such good
feedback and hear such lovely messages it just made
me feel so good, so now I’ve gone from that negative
person into this all positive me. (I2)
The expression “I released so much” may be seen as an
attempt to describe her affective, pleasurable discharge
that occurred as a result of uploading the video and the
responses she received. They resulted in a feeling of ease
for her. This is a distinct example of a pleasurable affec-
tive moment whereby feelings of solidarity, support and
care resulted in an affective experience which the indi-
vidual described as making her feel “so good”.
4.2. The Unpleasures of Affective Experiences
Many participants spoke in detail about the unpleasures
and anxieties associated with their labour on social me-
dia. Many said they feared being trolled or harassed on-
line, but this only strengthened their goals of raising
awareness and making their voices heard. “It [trolling]
is at the back of your mind but I try not to think about
it too much” (I1). “What’s the worst that can happen?
Get memed, trolled? They are just a random person on
a computer at the end of the day” (I3). “There’s the kind
of tweet where you just want to just reach through the
screen and just slap. So, I do find that with social me-
dia sometimes that it can be this cycle where you feel
like you have to have the last word and that’s not very
healthy, but for the most part it’s great.” (I4), as some
interviewees remarked. Such narratives can be seen as
examples of disaffection (Gibbs, 2002) whereby partic-
ular affective experiences are surpassed or left behind
through speaking about them and thereby rendering
them perhaps less affecting than they may have been in
the moment they occurred. Managing this, sometimes
tense, relationship of having a disfigurement and being
affected by others in a negative way was crucial for the
social media labour of the participants. One interviewee,
who had missing fingers, also spoke about unpleasur-
able experiences:
IE: I do get that on tubes, of people, like, taking pho-
tos of my hands.
IV: Really?
IE: Yes.
IV: What do you do when that happens?
IE: Well, it’s really awkward. I always think that I’m go-
ing to do something amazing, you know? I’m going to
be, you know, I’m going to say something and I’m go-
ing, and I just don’t because normally they’re…
IV: Well, it’s hard to do that.
IE: Well, also because they could be like, I’m not doing
that, you know?
IV: They could deny it.
IE: Unless they were right in front of me, like, zoom-
ing in, they could pretend they’re not doing it. You
know, I can see that they’re doing it and they’re laugh-
ing and they’re sharing it with their friends online or
whatever. (I4)
Those quotes show that social media use is an embod-
ied practice which revolves around affective intensities.
Those intensities circulate between social media users
and social media interfaces. As discussed, social media
may provide spaces for particular, pleasurable affective
atmospheres to emerge and be managed, but such at-
mosphere can also be disrupted by other users. Social
media labour was thus an ambivalent affair for the par-
ticipants and resulted in heightened self-monitoring and
care of what and how they posted online. Such prac-
tices are acts of affective-digital labour because they ulti-
mately aim to create feelings of ease, wellbeing, passion
and relationships online, or in short: the perfect product
of a self-commodified user. User labour on corporate so-
cial media is thus characterised by a sense of affective
fragility which both embraced and feared, managed and
disrupted periodically.
5. Conclusion: Towards a Psychoanalytic Theory of
Affective-Digital Labour
It was the goal of this article to introduce a model of
affective-digital labour based on Sigmund Freud’s works
on affect. The field of digital labour has predominantly
seen studies from political economy which examine the
phenomenon from a structural point of view. There are
some studies which have begun to theorise such labour
as affective and are interested in exploring the inher-
ent dimensions more (Jarrett, 2015; Pybus, 2013, 2015).
There is scope to continue such work, as I have done in
this article. Freud conceptualised an affective experience
as a subjective state where the body becomes its own
speaker (Stein, 1999). For him, affect is fleeting and tran-
sitory but can have strong and lasting impressions on the
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individual. This was demonstrated by the interview nar-
ratives in which people with facial disfigurements spoke
at length about their experience of using social media.
Objectively speaking, their use of social media is a form
of labour because it contributes to exchange value be-
ing generated by social media companies. There was
also another dimension which lent itself to theorising
the forms of self-presentation as labour because users
spoke of it in an almost business-like, entrepreneurial
manner. Their use of social media was goal directed to
raise awareness of their own bodies. I discussed various
examples that highlight pleasurable or unpleasurable af-
fective experiences of the interviewees. They had diffi-
culties fully translating such embodied experiences into
words. There is always a dimension that remains unrepre-
sentable. It cannot be fully described through language.
Through their labour, interviewees were keen to create
particular affective atmospheres on social media. Atmo-
spheres that were about creating and sustaining feelings
of ease, well-being and passion for all involved users.
This form of social media engagement shows how users
are agentic and empowered as well as attacked and dis-
rupted by others on social media. Their representation
gives them some form of power but this power comes
at a cost. It is exploited by social media companies and
affected by other users when they attack or make fun
of them. This results in a form of self-monitoring where
users try to navigate between presenting themselves,
but doing so in a manner that maintained a pleasurable
affective atmosphere.
I have thus put forward a distinct model of affec-
tive labour, which enriches the one developed by Hardt
and Negri as part of their work on immaterial labour
(2000, 2004). A psychoanalytic model of affective-digital
labour on social media takes account of embodied forms
of use which are contradictory, messy and in tension
with discourse. While I have arguably offered an illustra-
tion of affective labour through a particular angle (i.e.,
through a discussion of individuals with visible facial dif-
ferences), it can nonetheless point to more general di-
mensions of labour on social media. The professional
use in whichmany individuals use social media platforms
today is marked by particular, (un)pleasurable affective
experiences in relation to others. It is also about man-
aging affective atmospheres online through maintaining
particular relationalities (e.g., through posting in a cer-
tain way, liking another’s post, etc.). This labour is dif-
ficult to fully describe through language alone because
it is both based on individuals’ particular embodied sub-
jectivities as well as conducted in a bodily manner on-
line. Such a concept allows for inherent, rather than only
structural, aspects of affective-digital labour to be theo-
rised and researched.
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